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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Thus a broadcaster who plays and sends out an unauthorized musical
composition and for profit makes this selection available to the public is an
infringer. He is also a contributory infringer if he broadcasts the un-
authorized performance by another of a copyrighted musical composition.
J. H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co. (D. C. N. Y. 1925), 4 F. (2d)
160. The master set owner, it would seem, is in the same relative position.
The court in the instant case based its decision upon the further ground
that the defendant did not intentionally perform the copyrighted selection.
But lack of intention does not relieve him from liability. The result, and
not the intention, determines the question of infringement. Lawrence v.
Dana (1869), 4 Cliff. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 8136; M. Witmark and Sons v. Gallo-
way et al. (D. C. Tenn. 1927), 22 F. (2d) 412.
On other grounds than those put forth by the court it might be held that
the defendant is not liable. The doctrine might be set up that the con-
tract between the copyright owner and the broadcaster is for the benefit of
all who wish to receive and use the program, whether for personal enjoy-
ment or for profit.
Looking at the decision from the point of view of its practicality, there
is much to be said for it. A decision in favor of the copyright owner would
affect not only hotels but also restaurants, music shops, and similar estab-
lishments which constantly make use of broadcasts. The result would be
great inconvenience and a constant threat of unwarranted litigation.
When Congress framed the copyright act it did not foresee the advent of
the radio with its new problems. The balancing of interests which is
necessary in determining the scope of the protection to be afforded by a
copyright is one which Congress should deal with in further legislation.
Compare Associated Press v. International News Service (1918), 248 U. S.
215 at p. 248, per Brandeis J. dissenting. M. E. S., '31.
IN5suRA ,E-DuTY OF INDEMNIFIER TO SETTLE WrHIN POLICY Lir.--
In a suit against an indemnity company the assured sought to recover the
amount spent above the amount of the indemnity to satisfy a claim which de-
fendant company had allowed to go to judgment instead of settling for less
than the amount of the indemnity bond, as it could have done. The Texas court
in deciding in favor of the plaintiff, in Stowers Furniture Co. v. American
Indemnity Co. (Tex. 1929), 15 S. W. (2d) 544, said that the insurance com-
pany owes a duty of reasonable diligence in settling a suit against the
assured.
At first glance such a holding may seem very far-fetched since the as-
sured is never precluded from intervening and settling for whatever he
deems proper, and may then enforce his claim to the indemnity, even though
the liability was not established by a judgment. Mendota Electric Co. v.
N. Y. Indemnity Co. (1926), 169 Minn. 377, 211 N. W. 317; Hoagland
Wagon Co. v. London Guaranty Co. (1919), 201 Mo. A. 490, 212 S. W. 393;
Rieger v. London Guaranty Co. (1920), 202 Mo. A. 184, 215 S. W. 920.
Under such a view the assured takes the entire responsibility in case of a
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suit. This is an older view and was followed in Kingan & Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 182, 115 N. E. 348, in which it was held,
contrary to the holding in the more recent cases, that the insurer is not
required to settle for a sum within the face of the policy, but that he has
an election to defend, settle, or pay the face of the policy. Under this view
the insuring company is not subjected to the full risk of the litigation by
electing not to settle even though afterwards judgment is rendered in
excess of the indemnity provided by the policy. This rule is followed by
McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bond and Casualty Co. (1916), 173 App. Div.
100, 159 N. Y. S 401. In other instances the insurer was held liable only
to the extent of the face of the policy. Silverstein v. Standard Accident
Insurance Co. (1916), 175 App. Div. 639, 162 N. Y. S. 601; Wynnewood
Lumber Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co. (N. C. 1917), 91 S. E. 946; Ameri-
can Indemnity Co. v. Fellbaum (1924), 114 Tex. 127, 263 S. W. 908. These
cases seem to ignore the fundamental purpose of the assured in taking out
this indemnity insurance. He takes it as a protection. He would expect at
least the same reasonable care from the company in handling questions
arising under his policy that he would use himself. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the insurance contract contemplated a complete settlement of the
claim if possible in order to save the insured harmless. A more recent
and progressive view holds the company liable to the amount of the policy
either in case of settlement by the assured or a judgment against him.
Reilly v. Linden (1921), 151 Minn. 1, 186 N. W. 121. Still it does
not go far enough. The company should attempt to make the settlement
to the best advantage of all concerned. Reasonable prudence except in the
most exceptional case would be a settlement within the amount of the in-
demnity policy, when it is possible. The insurer owes the insured the duty
of settling before suit and is liable for failure to do so after finding that
the claim can be settled. Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident, Fire, and
Life Assurance Corp. (1919), 79 N. H. 186, 106 Atl. 604. The company
should be bound by the real purpose of the contract to take no needless
chances with the insured's funds. Clearly this is being done when the
case is allowed to go to a judgment. Douglas v. U. S. Fidelity and Guar-
anty Co. (1924), 81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl. 708. The general trend of cases
seems to be in the direction of the New Hampshire and Texas cases cited.
It is merely another instance of the increasing practicality of the holdings
of the courts. R. H. M., '30.
MARRIAGE--PARENTAL CONSENT-ANNULMENT.-In accordance with the
repeatedly-expressed reluctance of American courts to declare void a mar-
riage duly solemnized, though attended with irregularities or misrepre-
sentations in evading statutory regulations, the Supreme Court Of North
Carolina has declared that a minor, above the age of legal consent, whose
marriage was solemnized on the strength of a license procured by fraud
and without the parent's consent, cannot maintain an action to annul the
marriage. Sawyer v. Slack (1929), 196 N. C. 697, 146 S. E. 864.
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